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RUNNING THE GAUNTLET: ONCE Is ENOUGH WHEN
RUNNING FOR YOUR LIFE
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court faced a novel question in Satta-
zahn v. Pennsylvania: whether or not a defendant, who has received a
statutorily imposed life sentence, mandated by the state after the jury
deadlocked during his capital sentencing hearing, is entitled to double
jeopardy protection.2 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded
that the jury deadlock during the sentencing hearing was a "non-result,"
and should not be protected by double jeopardy.3 In contrast, the dissent,
led by Justice Ginsburg, argued that double jeopardy, in the context of
capital sentencing hearings, should be interpreted more expansively to
protect defendants from choosing between their constitutional right to
appeal and their state-mandated life sentence.4
The Sattazahn Court's decision holds serious implications for
criminal defendants sentenced to statutorily-imposed life imprisonment.
In particular, after Sattazahn, the costs of an appeal may now be too high
for a defendant given a statutory life term. Beyond the financial stress of
an appeal, a defendant and his family must also face the anxiety of a sec-
ond capital sentencing hearing. But, more importantly, in the wake of
Satazahn, that same defendant might ultimately pay for an unsuccessful
appeal with his life.
Though the entirety of consequences from the Court's decision in
Sattazahn remains to be seen, criminal defendants and their attorneys
have already felt its impact. For instance, in July 2003, only six months
after the Sattazahn decision, Kristen H. Gilbert withdrew her application
for appeal, even though she steadfastly maintained her innocence. 5 Gil-
bert was convicted of killing four patients while working as a nurse at a
veteran's hospital, and was sentenced to life in prison because the jury
could not unanimously agree on imposing the death penalty.6 Gilbert
faced the ultimate dilemma in deciding whether to appeal her conviction,
because after Sattazahn, if she appealed, double jeopardy would not pro-
tect her from receiving the death penalty on retrial. Faced with this un-
certainty, Gilbert explained, "I do not wish to face the death penalty
1. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
2. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 106.
3. Id. at 109.
4. See id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. Kathleen Burge, VA Nurse Drops Murder Appeal Cites Fear of Death Penalty if Granted
a New Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2003, at B 1.
6. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
again, and I do not wish to subject my family to the ordeal of a death
penalty trial again.",
7
Moreover, Sattazahn's impact is not limited to defendants, but has
also affected the attorneys who represent criminal defendants forced to
consider these issues. After Sattazahn, criminal defense attorneys worry
about the difficulty of advising clients under similar circumstances to
pursue an appeal of their conviction.8 Christopher Adams of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers summed up this angst noting,
"There is now a class of people basically prevented from appealing their
case." 9 In short, in the post-Sattazahn world, a defendant's options for
appeal may be significantly limited, and are, at the very least, signifi-
cantly colored by the possibility that he may face death if he opts to chal-
lenge his conviction.
Finally, lurking in the shadows of Sattazahn, are recent studies that
raise substantial questions regarding the effectiveness and reliability of
the death penalty process. 10 In January 2003, former Illinois Governor
George Ryan commuted the sentences of 167 on death row, saying he
felt "a moral obligation to act because the system is 'haunted by the de-
mon of error."' 11 Nationwide, as of July 2003, 110 former death row
inmates have been exonerated at retrial. 12 Richard Dieter, executive di-
rector of the Death Penalty Information Center, postulated on Satta-
zahn's impact on this phenomena, and questioned how many of those
former prisoners would have risked their appeals if they knew they could
face another death sentence.
13
Within this backdrop, this Comment will explore the Supreme
Court's decision in Sattazahn and the historical setting that precipitated
the Sattazahn Court's ultimate conclusions about double jeopardy and its
application to capital sentencing. Specifically, Part I of this Comment
will review the historical framework of United States Supreme Court
double jeopardy decisions as well as the underlying context of capital
punishment sentencing, including the evolution of the bifurcated trial.
Part II will specifically consider and unravel both majority and dissenting
opinions presented in Sattazahn. Part III will critically analyze these
opinions with attention to the underlying principles of the double jeop-
ardy doctrine and the fundamental tenants of capital sentencing theory.
Within this framework, Part III will also suggest that the Sattazahn ma-
7. Id.
8. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject a Double-Jeopardy Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2003, at A14.
9. Id.
10. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-19 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(discussing recent studies and journal articles that call into question the effectiveness and propriety
of the death penalty).
11. A Stir in Death Penalty Debate, NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 2003, at A13.




jority disregarded the Court's own precedent by refusing to acknowledge
that "'death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country."",14 Finally, the Comment concludes that the
Sattazahn Court abandoned the primary protection historically and theo-
retically afforded by double jeopardy--specifically that once a defendant
has run the gauntlet by submitting his case to a jury and receiving a final
judgment, he will not be required to run that gauntlet again.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... 15 The Supreme Court set forth the Ameri-
can double jeopardy standard in the landmark case, Ball v. United
States.'6 The Ball decision established the principle that an acquittal, no
matter how defective, is a final judgment protected by double jeopardy.
17
Moreover, the decision established the corollary of that principle: that
double jeopardy does not protect a conviction that is overturned on an
appeal initiated at the defendant's request.1
8
1. Stroud v. United States
19
After the Ball Court set the American standard for double jeopardy
doctrine, the Court next addressed the double jeopardy implications for a
defendant who received a harsher sentence after retrial in Stroud v.
United States.2° In Stroud, the jury convicted the defendant of murder
and sentenced him to death by hanging. 2' Due to a procedural error,
however, the Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial.22 Upon retrial, the jury again convicted
23the defendant of murder, but this time sentenced him to life in prison.
Once again, the appellate court set aside the verdict due to error, and the
24defendant was tried a third time. At the conclusion of the third trial, the
jury again found the defendant guilty of murder, but, rather than recom-
mending a life sentence, the jury imposed death.25
14. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Vt. 2002) (quoting Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
17. Ball, 163 U.S. at 671.
18. Id. at 672.
19. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
20. Stroud, 251 U.S. 15.
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 16-17.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 17-18.
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The Stroud Court held that, in accordance with Ball, double jeop-
ardy did not protect the defendant's two prior reversals.26 Accordingly,
the Stroud Court concluded that the defendant was properly retried for
the same offense.27 As for receiving the death penalty after the third trial,
the Court determined that the jury was given the option to recommend a
life sentence, but declined to do so. 28 The fact that the defendant received
a life sentence after his first retrial did not trigger double jeopardy pro-
tection because that sentence was vacated when the defendant success-
fully appealed his conviction. 29 Therefore, the Court concluded, the de-
fendant was properly retried for murder, and his sentence, the death pen-
alty, was a legitimate punishment for that crime.3°
2. North Carolina v. Pearce
31
Fifty years after Stroud, the Court again addressed the question of
whether double jeopardy should protect a defendant from receiving a
harsher sentence upon retrial in North Carolina v. Pearce.32 In Pearce,
the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, and
was sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in prison.33 Several years after
his conviction, the defendant successfully appealed his case and was
granted a new trial.34 Upon retrial, the defendant was again found guilty
and was sentenced to eight years in prison.35 However, when the court
considered the defendant's second sentence, coupled with the time he
had already served, his total sentence resulted in a longer prison term
than his original sentence.
36
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy does not
bar a harsher sentence upon retrial when the original conviction has been
set aside at the defendant's request. 37 Justice Stewart, writing for the ma-
jority, summed up the history and purpose of the double jeopardy doc-
trine by explaining that "the rationale [for double jeopardy] ... rests ul-
timately upon the premise that the original conviction has, at the defen-
dant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean. 38 How-
ever, the Court ultimately ruled that, although the defendant must be





31. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
32. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
33. Id. at 713.
34. State v. Pearce, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920-21 (N.C. 1966).
35. Pearce, 395 U.S. 713.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 719-20.
38. Id. at 720-21.
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given credit for the time he has served under his original sentence, the
unexpired portion of the original sentence should be vacated.39
Thus, the Pearce Court concluded that, if acquitted, the defendant
would not have to serve the remainder of his original sentence. 40 How-
ever, if convicted upon retrial, the defendant must serve his lawful pun-
ishment for his second conviction, even if that resulted in a longer total
sentence than his original sentence. 4' This rationale has provided the
basis for the modern double jeopardy standard: there is no constitutional
guarantee protecting a defendant from a harsher sentence at retrial.42
3. Bullington v. Missouri
43
Even after Pearce, the Supreme Court's treatment of double jeop-
ardy remained unsettled, particularly in the context of the death penalty.
In fact, only twelve years later, the Court in Bullington v. Missouri4 re-
fused to extend the Pearce rationale to life sentences imposed in the con-
text of capital sentencing.45
Capital punishment in the United States went through significant
transformations in 1972 with the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia.46After Furman47 and its progeny, states continuing to enforce
the death penalty developed bifurcated trials to meet Furman's dual con-
stitutional mandates of guiding and limiting the jury's discretion, and
ensuring that the jury has the opportunity to consider the defendant's
individual circumstances.48 A bifurcated trial divides a capital murder
trial into two separate components: first, a trial on guilt or innocence, and
then, if the defendant is found guilty, a separate sentencing hearing to
consider the appropriateness of the death penalty.49 For example, in Bull-
ington, Missouri law required that during the capital sentencing hearing,
the jury should consider additional evidence of mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors relevant to the defendant's crime. '0 Additionally, Missouri
39. See id. at 718-19, 721.
40. Id. at 721.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 720-21.
43. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
44. Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
45. Id. at 445.
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
47. Each of the five Justices concurring in the judgment of the Court issued a separate opinion
finding that the death penalty, as applied to three petitioners, one convicted of murder and two
convicted of rape, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57, 305, 310, 314, 370.
48. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475-76 (D. Vt. 2002) (discussing the
reasoning behind the bifurcated trial system).
49. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 433-34.
50. See id. at 433-34, 435 n.4. The defendant was sentenced under Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006
(1978), that provides in relevant part:
Where the jury ... returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided in subsection 1 of
this section [trials upon an indictment for capital murder], the court shall resume the trial
and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury ... at which time the only issue shall
2003]
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law required the judge to instruct the jury that, even if they found proof
of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, they were permitted,
but not required, to impose the death penalty.51
Within this legislative and constitutional framework, the Supreme
Court considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to mod-
em capital sentencing schemes. In Bullington, the defendant was con-
victed of capital murder.52 The day after his conviction, the sentencing
phase of the trial began with the prosecution presenting evidence of ag-
gravating circumstances justifying the death penalty.53 The defense pre-
sented no evidence of mitigating circumstances.5 4 After deliberations, the
jury recommended a life sentence for the defendant, rather than the death
penalty. 55
Shortly after his conviction, the Court granted the defendant a new
trial.56 The state promptly notified the defense of its intent to pursue the
death penalty at retrial.57 Bullington argued that his life sentence was
protected by double jeopardy, thus barring the prosecution from retrying
the death sentence. 58 The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, held that
neither double jeopardy, nor any other constitutional provision, barred
the prosecution from seeking the death penalty upon retrial.59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Supreme
Court of Missouri in a landmark opinion that remains controversial to
this day. 60 First, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, distinguished
Buffington from previous double jeopardy cases.6 ' Justice Blackmun
be the determination of the punishment to be imposed. In such hearing, subject to the
laws of evidence, the jury . . . shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation,
and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions
and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any
such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the
prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The
jury... shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting at-
torney regarding the punishment to be imposed.... Upon conclusion of the evidence and
arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire
to determine the punishment to be imposed.
Id.
51. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 434-35 (citing Mo. APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS CRIM. § 15.46
(1979)).
52. Id. at 435.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 435-36.
56. Id. at 436. After Bullington was convicted, the United States Supreme Court decided
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), in which the Court found Missouri's constitutional and
statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemptions from jury duty deprived a
defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360. Thus, the trial
court granted Bullington a new trial based on Duren. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
57. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
58. Id.
59. State ex rel Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
60. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 437, 446.
61. See id. at 444-46.
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found that, while Pearce stands for the principle that a retrial after appeal
nullifies the first judgment and wipes the slate clean, this principle does
not apply when a jury finds the prosecution has failed to prove every
element of its case, including the aggravating factors necessary to impose
the death penalty.62 Further, Justice Blackmun grounded the Court's de-
cision in precedent and suggested that the Court's decision in Green v.
United States63 foreshadowed this exception to the Pearce rationale.
64
In Green, the jury declined to convict the defendant of first-degree
murder, but did convict him of the lesser included charge of second-
degree murder.65 Upon retrial, the Court held that double jeopardy pro-
tected the defendant from facing a second trial on first-degree murder
because the defendant "was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge
and the jury refused to convict him.",66 Applying Green's rationale to
Bullington, Justice Blackmun explained that in a capital sentencing hear-
ing, the prosecution carries the burden of proving such aggravating fac-
tors beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded that
a modem capital sentencing hearing resembled a trial, with a life sen-
tence being the equivalent of an acquittal on the death penalty, and there-
fore warranting double jeopardy protection.68
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun declared that affording double jeop-
ardy protection to the results of capital sentencing hearings was consis-
tent with the underlying constitutional principle of protecting defendants
from the "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" of multiple prosecu-
69 Baku detions. Significantly, Justice Blackmun added that allowing the State,
with its limitless resources, to continue to pursue the death penalty,
would result in an "'unacceptably high risk' ... [of] an erroneously im-
1170posed death sentence ....
In contrast, Justice Powell, writing for the dissent in Bullington, dis-
agreed that a sentencing hearing in a bifurcated trial sufficiently resem-
bled a trial on the merits thus warranting double jeopardy protection. 71 In
a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell proclaimed, "I consider the
Court's opinion irreconcilable in principle with the precedents of this
Court. 7 2 Citing both Stroud and Pearce, Justice Powell reiterated the
long-established double jeopardy principle that a defendant may receive
62. See id. at 443-46.
63. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
64. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442-43 (citing Green, 355 U.S. 184).
65. Green, 355 U.S. at 186.
66. Id. at 190.
67. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446.
68. See id. at 445-46.
69. Id. at 445 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88).
70. Id. (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980)).
71. See id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2003]
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a harsher sentence upon retrial.73 Furthermore, the dissent rejected the
majority's conclusion that a jury's recommendation of a life sentence in
a capital sentencing hearing amounted to an implicit acquittal of the
death penalty.74
4. Arizona v. Rumsey
75
Three years after Bullington, the Court, in Arizona v. Rumsey 76 ex-
tended double jeopardy protection to capital sentencing hearings in
which the judge, rather than the jury, sentenced the defendant to life in
prison.77 The Supreme Court held that a life sentence issued by the trial
judge amounts to "an acquittal on the merits," and in accordance with
Bullington, must bar any retrial on sentencing, even if based on legal
error.
78
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented on the basis
that Bullington was wrongly decided, and, moreover, that the reasoning
behind Bullington does not apply to cases in which resentencing is re-
quired due to legal error.79 Justice Rehnquist argued "[b]ut for the trial
judge's erroneous construction of governing state law, the judge would
have been required to impose the death penalty., 80 Thus, Rehnquist con-
cluded, there was no logical reason to overturn the death sentence in this
case, simply because the Arizona Supreme Court corrected a legal error
of the trial judge.81
Thus, double jeopardy doctrine evolved over the course of a hun-
dred years. Beginning with the basic concept of permitting the State to
retry a defendant who has successfully overturned his conviction, the
Court then addressed the application of double jeopardy to a defendant
who received a harsher sentence upon retrial. Finally, the Court consid-
ered the more complex issues of how double jeopardy doctrine should
apply in a context of capital sentencing. Bullington and Rumsey, the
Court's final words on double jeopardy before Sattazahn, represent the
crossroads between traditional double jeopardy doctrine and the rela-
tively new concept of capital sentencing hearings.
B. Overview of the History and Development of Capital Sentencing
Under English law in the late eighteenth century, a defendant's con-
viction on an indictment resulted in a specific statutorily determined sen-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 448-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
76. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203.
77. Id. at 211-12.
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 214-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 81:2
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tence that the judge had no discretion to alter.8 2 The judge's sole re-
course, if he thought the sentence was exceedingly harsh, was to com-
mute the sentence through the pardon process.83
In contrast, as American sentencing procedures developed during
the nineteenth century, trial judges began to exercise wide discretion in
determining a defendant's punishment within the parameters of statuto-
rily prescribed limits.8 4 During this period, the jury's role was to deter-
mine if the prosecution had proved every element of the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.8 5 If the jury found the defendant guilty, the judge's
role was to review a broad range of information regarding the case to
determine the most appropriate sentence. 86 In accordance with the phi-
losophy of individualized and indeterminate sentencing, the judge was
permitted to consider a broad range of facts, including facts that would
not be admissible at trial, such as hearsay.87
Currently, a judge's sentencing discretion is restricted by federal
and state sentencing guidelines.88 Capital sentencing hearings are re-
stricted at the federal level by the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) and
at the state level by statutory requirements.8 9 However, the more relaxed
evidentiary standards permitted during the discretionary period of sen-
tencing remain in place today.90 Furthermore, in a post-Furman world,
sentencing must meet the dual constitutional requirements of guiding and
limiting the jury's discretion, as well as providing for individualized con-
sideration of facts specific to the defendant's circumstances. 91 In order to
meet these seemingly disparate goals, the FDPA, for example, treats ag-
gravating death penalty factors as similar to elements of a capital offense,
thus requiring the prosecution to prove such factors to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.92 However, if these factors were proven during the
sentencing phase of the trial, the relaxed evidentiary standards, not per-
missible at trial, would be allowed.93
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey
94
In recent years, the Supreme Court has struggled to determine the
scope and nature of constitutional requirements with respect to modem
82. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 (2000) (discussing criminal law treatment
in eighteenth century England).
83. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
84. See id. at 481.





90. See id. at 482-83.
91. See id. at 482.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 483.
94. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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criminal sentencing. For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,95 the Su-
preme Court considered the nature of sentencing factors that had the ef-
fect of enhancing a defendant's punishment for the crime but were not
part of underlying crime. In particular, the Supreme Court examined
whether the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants at
trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied with equal force
solely in the context of sentencing. The Apprendi Court found that when
proof of an additional fact increases the statutory maximum penalty for a
crime, then that fact is the "functional equivalent" of an element, regard-
less of its label. 96 Further, the Court concluded that if a fact is the "func-
tional equivalent" of an element, then the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
require that a jury make that finding of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.97
2. Ring v. Arizona
98
Only two years after deciding Apprendi, the Supreme Court, true to
form, followed the same analysis in the context of capital sentencing in
Ring v. Arizona.99 In Ring, the jury convicted the defendant of felony
murder.' °° According to state law, after the defendant's conviction, the
trial judge was required to make further findings regarding the existence
of aggravating and mitigating factors.10' After his review, the sentencing
judge recommended the death penalty,10 2 a sentence later affirmed by the
Arizona Supreme Court. 10 3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
overturned the Arizona decision.' °4 The Ring Court applied the Apprendi
rationale to conclude that a sentencing factor enhancing the defendant's
ultimate sentence from life to death is the functional equivalent of an
element of the offense.105 Accordingly, like Apprendi, the Ring Court
found that to comport with Sixth Amendment guarantees, a jury and not
a judge must find the existence of that sentencing factor beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 106 In short, after Furman, capital sentencing requires
proof of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty. In Ring, the Court found the statutory aggrava-
95. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83. Apprendi pled guilty to one count of second-degree posses-
sion of a firearm after he fired several shots into the home of an African-American family, and stated
he did not want the family living in his neighborhood because of their race. Id. at 469. Apprendi later
retracted this statement. Id. Apprendi's conviction carried a prison sentence of five to ten years;
however, because the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was racially
motivated, his sentence was enhanced beyond the statutory limit to a twelve-year term. Id. at 470-71.
96. Id. at 494 n. 19.
97. Id. at 490.
98. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
99. Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
100. Id. at 592.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 594.
103. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1154-56 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).





tors and mitigating factors to be functional equivalents of elements of the
defendant's underlying crime and, thus, required that a jury make find-
ings on those factors beyond a reasonable doubt.° 7
In addition to the significant effects on states' capital sentencing re-
gimes, 1 8 the Ring opinion also illustrated the Court's disparate views on
the capital sentencing process since Furman.°9 The majority emphasized
that in order to meet the constitutional requirements of the Eighth
Amendment, the states had devised elaborate capital sentencing proce-
dures, but that this alone was not constitutionally sufficient if the process
did not also incorporate other protections, such as the right to a trial by a
jury under the Sixth Amendment." 0 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, expressed his concern over the burdens placed on the states by
Furman.11 However, Justice Scalia joined with the majority largely be-
cause of his concerns over the erosion of the right to a jury trial. 12 Jus-
tice Breyer, who dissented in the Apprendi decision, nevertheless joined
in the Ring decision based on his belief that a constitutional capital sen-
tencing hearing under the Eighth Amendment requires that a death sen-
tence must be imposed by a jury, and not a judge.13
Thus, the capital sentencing process today reflects the tension be-
tween Furman's requirements of limiting the jury's discretion by provid-
ing sentencing guidelines, and the concomitant obligation to provide
defendants with the benefit of individualized consideration. This inherent
tension is exacerbated by the deep divisions within the Court as to what
constitutional protections should apply to capital sentencing hearings and
the rationales behind those protections. An appreciation of the history of
the capital sentencing process as well as the Court's conflicting ideolo-
gies is essential to unravel and comprehend the Court's otherwise inex-
plicable decision in Sattazahn.
I. SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA" 4
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Sattazahn, the defendant and his accomplice robbed a restaurant
manager one evening, and shot him in the back as he tried to flee. 1 5 At
107. Id.
108. See Jason E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Collide: Out of
the Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 519,
522-23 (2004) (noting that the Ring Court's decision requiring that juries impose the death penalty
struck down capital sentencing schemes in seven states and called into question the schemes of at
least four other states).
109. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 606-19.
110. Id. at 606-08.
Ill. Id. at 610-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 614, 618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
115. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103.
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trial, a jury convicted Sattazahn of numerous charges, including capital
murder, assault, and conspiracy. 116 During the penalty phase of trial, the
prosecution presented evidence of one aggravating circumstance: the
commission of murder while perpetrating another felony. 117 The defense
presented evidence of two mitigating circumstances: first, the defen-
dant's lack of a significant criminal history, and second, his age at the
time of the crime. 1 8 After three and a half hours of deliberation, the jury
notified the judge that they were hopelessly deadlocked. 1
9 The judge
dismissed the jury, and, as required by Pennsylvania statute,
120 entered a
sentence of life imprisonment.
2
Sattazahn appealed and successfully had his original conviction
overturned on the basis that the trial judge erred when instructing the jury
regarding the charges. 122 Upon retrial, the defendant was again convicted
of capital murder. 2 3 During his capital sentencing hearing, the prosecu-
tion offered evidence not only of the original aggravating factor, but also
of an additional aggravating factor not presented during the first trial.
24
The defendant argued that double jeopardy barred the state both from
seeking the death penalty on retrial, and also from presenting evidence of
the second aggravating circumstance on retrial.22 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion, and the jury sentenced him to 
death. 126
On appeal before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Sattazahn ar-
gued that his statutorily mandated life sentence should be protected by
double jeopardy, despite being required as a result of a jury 
deadlock. 27
Moreover, the defense argued that the imposition of the death penalty
violated Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantee granting a right to ap-
peal, a right omitted from the Federal Constitution. 28 Sattazahn further
116. Id.
117. Id. at 104.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 104-05 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(1)(v) (Purdon Supp. 2002) which
states "the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further delibera-
tion will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.").
121. Id. at 105.
122. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 600, 606 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993).
123. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 105.
124. Id. During retrial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of two aggravating factors: the
commission of the murder during the perpetration of another felony, and the defendant's prior felony
convictions involving threats of violence against another person. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000).
128. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 368. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in relevant part:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record;
and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative
agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by
law.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
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argued that any rational defendant in his position would decline to exer-
cise his state constitutional right to appeal if the ultimate failure of that
appeal could result in losing the life sentence that he already received.
129
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Sattazahn's arguments,
instead finding that since the jury deadlocked during the sentencing pro-
ceeding, there was no clearly implied acquittal on the merits warranting
double jeopardy protection. 130 Furthermore, the court added that there
was no evidence that the legislature intended the imposition of a life sen-
tence after jury deadlock to equate to a final sentence. 13' Finally, the
court dismissed the defendant's argument that the imposition of the death
penalty had a chilling effect on his state constitutional right to appeal,
concluding "Sattazahn ignores the fact that ...the United States Su-
preme Court has rejected the claim that a harsher sentence on retrial has
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal... his conviction."
'132
B. The Majority Opinion
Sattazahn presented the Court with an opportunity, for the first
time, to define what constitutes a mistrial during a capital sentencing
hearing.133 Specifically, the Court addressed whether double jeopardy
protects a defendant who receives a life sentence because of a jury dead-
lock during the sentencing phase of a capital trial from facing another
death penalty prosecution upon retrial. 134 The Court sharply divided on
the issue, with Justice O'Connor providing the tie-breaking vote in favor
of the State's position that the life sentence was not a final verdict on the
merits and therefore not protected by double jeopardy. 135
Writing for the five justice majority, Justice Scalia first distin-
guished Sattazahn from Bullington and Rumsey. 136 Justice Scalia sug-
gested that double jeopardy applied to those cases because they resulted
from the jury's finding of additional facts during the sentencing hearing
and not because of the life sentences initially imposed. 137 Further, Justice
Scalia rejected the defendant's argument that Bullington recognized a
unique standard for double jeopardy protection in the context of capital
sentencing. 38 Rather, Justice Scalia explained that the relevant trigger
for double jeopardy protection was merely whether or not the sentence
equated to an acquittal on the merits. 139 Thus, because Sattazahn's life
129. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 368.
130. Id. at 367.
131. ld. at 368.
132. Id. at 368-69.
133. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 109.
135. Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 108-10.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 109.
139. Id.
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sentence resulted from a jury deadlock, and not from the jury's findings
on the merits, the majority reasoned that double jeopardy should not ap-
pl-140ply.
n
Additionally, in Part III of the opinion, Justice Scalia discussed the
impact of Apprendi and Ring to support his conclusion that a jury dead-
lock during capital sentencing is not protected by double jeopardy.1 41 In
particular, Justice Scalia reiterated that, under Apprendi, any fact that
increases the maximum sentence a defendant may receive for his crime is
the functional equivalent of an element of that crime, and must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 Justice Scalia noted that Ring applied Ap-
prendi's analysis to capital sentencing, and found that, in accordance
with the Sixth Amendment, only a jury, and not a judge, can find the
existence of additional aggravating factors. 1
43
Applying Apprendi and Ring to the double jeopardy consideration,
Justice Scalia reasoned that "'murder plus one or more aggravating cir-
cumstances"' is the offense on trial during the sentencing proceeding.
44
A jury's recommendation of a life sentence, therefore, is essentially an
implied acquittal on the charge of "murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances" and a conviction of the lesser-included offense of mur-
der.' 45 Accordingly, Justice Scalia acknowledged that after Ring, double
jeopardy protection must be afforded to the jury's life sentence when that
result is essentially an "'acquittal' on the offense of 'murder plus aggra-
vating circumstance(s).
' , 146
However, the majority refused to extend this reasoning to cases like
Sattazahn' s, where the jury deadlocked during the sentencing hearing.
147
In Mr. Sattazahn's case, his life sentence resulted from the default judg-
ment mandated by Pennsylvania statute and not from a jury's findings on
the merits. 48 Thus, because there was no implied acquittal on Satta-
zahn's charge of murder plus aggravating circumstances, the majority
concluded that double jeopardy did not protect his statutorily imposed
life sentence.'
49
Justice Scalia also added that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cor-
rectly found that there was no evidence indicating that the state legisla-
ture intended the statutorily required life sentence to be a final verdict.
50
140. Id.




145. Id. at 112-13.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Id. at 103-04.
148. Id. at 113.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 110.
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Justice Scalia suggested that, in the interest of saving the expense and
resources required by another sentencing hearing, a State may be willing
to accept the life sentence.151 However, should the State have to go to the
expense of a whole new trial, due to the defendant's successful appeal,
the state may be "eager to attend to that unfinished business ....
Finally, Justice Scalia used his opinion to respond to several argu-
ments raised by the dissent. First, Justice Scalia rejected the suggestion
that the Court's earlier holding in United States v. Scott 5 3 mandated a
different result in Sattazahn.154 Specifically, Justice Scalia denounced the
dissenters' assertion that because double jeopardy may protect a judge's
termination of trial proceedings in favor of a defendant where the basis
of the termination is not related to guilt or innocence, a similar applica-
tion of double jeopardy is appropriate where the defendant is sentenced
to death on retrial. 55 According to Justice Scalia, the dissent's reliance
on Scott was misguided, and was "a thin reed on which to rest a hitherto
unknown constitutional prohibition of the entirely rational course of
making a hung jury's failure to convict provisionally final, subject to
change if the case must be retried anyway."'' 56 Moreover, Justice Scalia
explained that double jeopardy does not protect either the termination of
charges on a motion for pre-indictment delay as in Scott, or the life sen-
tence in Sattazahn, because, in both cases, the outcomes did not result
from a jury's findings on the merits of the case.
157
Furthermore, Justice Scalia addressed and summarily dismissed the
argument that allowing the state to pursue the death penalty a second
time following defendant's successful appeal of his underlying convic-
tion would have a chilling effect on future appeals. 58 According to Jus-
tice Scalia, the chilling effect of multiple prosecutions has never been
determinative of double jeopardy protection, and there was no reason for
the Court to change course in Sattazahn.159 Reiterating his earlier discus-
sion of the state's economic interests, Justice Scalia stated "[t]his case
hardly presents the specter of 'an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing
a defendant .... ,,,60 Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned, the circumstances
in Sattazahn illustrated a state, reasonably willing to conserve its eco-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (rejecting "the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited
any new trial after the setting aside of a of a judgment of conviction against the defendant or that it
guarantees to him the right of being hung, to protect him from the danger of a second trial" (internal
quotations omitted)).
154. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113-14.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 114.
158. Id.
159. ld. (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
160. Id. at 114-15.
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nomic resources by accepting the default life sentence, unless required to
undertake the expense of a retrial at the defendant's behest. 16'
In sum, the majority was unwilling to reexamine and ultimately
modify the application of double jeopardy protection in the context of
capital sentencing.1 62 The Court held, quite narrowly, that double jeop-
ardy only protects verdicts based on the findings of the jury, and a de-
fault judgment entered by the State because of a jury deadlock is not a
final verdict. 163 Additionally, the majority concluded that, on balance,
any potential chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal was out-
weighed by the economic interests of the State."
C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer
joined, took issue with the majority, and instead found that the defen-
dant's statutorily imposed life sentence should be considered a final ver-
dict warranting double jeopardy protection.1 65 Justice Ginsburg explained
that even though Sattazahn's verdict resulted from a hung jury, this fact
alone should not be dispositive, because jeopardy may terminate in cir-
cumstances other than acquittal. 166 Ginsburg suggested that Sattazahn's
statutorily imposed life sentence belonged in the same category of cases
as Scott, where a judge terminates the trial before a determination of guilt
or innocence, and the prosecution may not immediately refile the indict-
ment, but must seek a reversal of the trial court ruling. 67 Under Justice
Ginsburg's reasonsing, this category includes proceedings where the
court grants a motion to terminate, 168 or as in Sattazahn, where the Statemandates a life sentence because of a jury deadlock.169
In Scott, Justice Ginsburg explained, the Court refused to grant
double jeopardy protection because the defendant elected to terminate his
trial before submission to the jury, even though the prosecution was will-
ing to present its case. 170 Distinguishing Sattazahn from Scott, Justice
Ginsburg underscored the fact that Sattazahn submitted his case to the
jury, thereby "running the gauntlet" once on the death penalty. 17 Unlike
the defendant in Scott, Justice Ginsburg noted that Sattazahn, did not
161. Id. at 115.
162. See id. at 109.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 110, 115.
165. Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 121-22 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 122 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court considers motions
to terminate that are immediately subject to re-prosecution as mistrials, as distinguished from mo-
tions to terminate that must be appealed by the prosecution before retrial).
169. Id. at 122 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 125 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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voluntarily terminate his sentencing hearing.172 In fact, Justice Ginsburg
explained, Scott's voluntarily termination of the proceedings before
submitting his case to the jury was the very basis for the Court's denial
of double jeopardy protection. 73 Unlike the State in Scott however,
Pennsylvania already had one complete opportunity to present its case
against Sattazahn to the jury.174 In short, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, Sat-
tazahn's sentencing hearing terminated not because the jury deadlocked,
but rather because the State required termination in accordance with its
own statute.
175
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg stressed, the State was required to
accept the statutory life sentence as a final judgment, and had no statu-
tory right to appeal the sentence. 176 This, according to Justice Ginsburg,
afforded Sattazahn far more entitlement to double jeopardy protection
than the defendant's dismissal for pre-indictment delay in Scott.
177
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg strongly criticized the impact of the
majority's decision on defendants and warned that the holding would
necessarily force defendants to choose between exercising their constitu-
tional right to an appeal or risk losing a life sentence to a sentence of
death. 78 According to Justice Ginsburg, this unenviable choice violates
previous Court interpretations of double jeopardy. 179 To support her as-
sertion, Justice Ginsburg explained that in Green, the Court refused to
prolong jeopardy on a first-degree murder charge when the defendant,
convicted of a related second-degree murder charge, successfully ap-
pealed his conviction. 180 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the Green Court
ultimately concluded that prolonging jeopardy would impermissibly re-
quire the defendant to "'barter [his] constitutional protection against a
second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as the price of a
successful appeal ... of another offense.""1
8'
Finally, Justice Ginsburg stressed that Sattazahn was facing the
death penalty, a punishment the Court has long recognized as being
"'unique in both its severity and its finality.' ' '182 Because Sattazahn was
facing death, he had a heightened double jeopardy interest in protecting
his life sentence and avoiding a second death penalty trial. 83 Thus, Jus-




175. Id. at 123-24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 126-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957)).
182. Id. (quoting Monge v. Califomia, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
183. Id.
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tice Ginsburg concluded that the historical double jeopardy principles of
protecting defendants from the ordeal and anxiety of multiple prosecu-




Justice Scalia's reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey185 and Ring v.
Arizona'86 to support his decision in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania 17 is dis-
ingenuous, given that both Apprendi and Ring provide capital murder
defendants with additional constitutional protections,1 88 while Sattazahn
strips constitutional safeguards away.189 Since Furman v. Georgia,190 the
Court has addressed repeatedly the safeguards necessary to ensure that
capital sentencing regimes adequately protect a defendant's constitu-
tional rights. 19' For instance, the bifurcated trial evolved as a solution to
the dual constitutional requirements of sufficiently guiding a jury's dis-
cretion while providing the defendant with the benefit of individualized
consideration. 192 Ring provided further protections to capital murder de-
fendants by ensuring that any aggravating factors justifying the imposi-
tion of the death penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 193 Sattazahn, however, uses the reasoning of Apprendi and Ring to
justify applying another constitutional protection, double jeopardy, in a
draconian fashion, thus resulting in an outcome that places capital mur-
der defendants in a worse position than they were before their appeal.
194
Justice Scalia conceded in Sattazahn that a defendant's life sentence
should be afforded double jeopardy protection, but only when such a
sentence is based on a jury's findings as defined in Apprendi and Ring.
195
While this is a seemingly attractive argument at first glance, the ugly
underside comes to light after close examination. In Ring, Justice Scalia
proposed that the protections afforded to capital murder defendants, start-
ing with Furman, had "no proper foundation in the Constitution."'' 96 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Scalia stated that he was "reluctant to magnify the bur-
dens that our Furman jurisprudence imposes on the States.' 97 These
184. Id.
185. 530 U.S. 466 (2002).
186. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
187. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
188. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
189. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 118.
190. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
191. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 606.
192. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,432-33 (1981).
193. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
194. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12.
195. Id. at 112.




"burdens" include the bifurcated trial, and constitutional protections such
as requiring the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable
doubt, and guaranteeing the defendant that only a jury, not a judge, may
impose a death sentence. 98 Justice Scalia, however, ultimately concurred
in the Ring decision because he believed "our people's traditional belief
in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline."'199 Thus, even though
Justice Scalia expressed significant reservations regarding the legitimacy
of the current capital sentencing process, he nevertheless concurred in a
judgment that effectively enhanced constitutional protections afforded to
capital murder defendants. °°
However, Sattazahn, presented Justice Scalia with an opportunity to
take the rationales of Apprendi and Ring and use them to undermine the
fundamental goals of the bifurcated trial process. 20 1 Essentially, by find-
ing that only life sentences imposed as a result of a jury's findings are
protected, Justice Scalia effectively eliminated from constitutional pro-
tection any life sentence imposed as a default judgment when a jury can-
not unanimously agree to the death penalty, even if such a sentence is not
subject to appellate review by the State.20 2 Such sentences will only be
considered final verdicts protected by double jeopardy if the State clearly
203expresses that intention.
Justice Scalia is correct that, traditionally, double jeopardy doctrine
allows for harsher sentencing upon retrial when a defendant successfully
appeals his conviction. 204 However, Justice Scalia ignores that this dou-
ble jeopardy doctrine developed well before the idea of a bifurcated trial
was even imagined.20 5 Furthermore, he is correct that Apprendi and Ring
provide that a jury must find every element of an offense, including
aggravating sentencing factors, beyond a reasonable doubt.20 6 However,
the Sattazahn majority ignores that Apprendi and Ring were driven by
the necessity for further constitutional protections in the capital sentenc-
207ing hearing process. Thus, through selective interpretation, Justice
Scalia cleverly cloaked his majority opinion in Sattazahn under
traditional double jeopardy doctrine, Apprendi and Ring, while hoping
others do not see his naked intention of undermining the last thirty years
of capital sentencing jurisprudence.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. See id.
201. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12.
202. See id. at 113-14.
203. See id. at 110.
204. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,722 (1969).
205. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442.
206. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
207. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 536 U.S. at 596-97.
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B. Policy Discussion
The fundamental principle of the double jeopardy doctrine is to pro-
tect defendants from facing the embarrassment, anxiety and ordeal of
multiple prosecutions. °8 Additionally, this principle recognizes that al-
lowing the State, with its infinite resources, multiple opportunities to
prosecute the same defendant, increases the likelihood of an improper
conviction. 209 Furthermore, the Court has long held that death is different
and unique among punishments. 10 In fact death is the ultimate punish-
ment-entirely irreversible in its finality. 211 Therefore, when the underly-
ing principles of the double jeopardy doctrine are combined with the
constitutional requirements for capital punishment, the result should be
an exponentially magnified concern for the rights of the defendant.21 2
Regrettably, this is precisely what did not happen in Sattazahn.
For a defendant, who has already "run the gauntlet" once on the
death penalty and received a life sentence by any means other than by the
agreement of the jury, the Sattazahn decision effectively eliminates any
prospect for appealing his underlying conviction, while avoiding the
death penalty.213 The defendant, under these circumstances, would only
appeal his underlying conviction if he were willing to risk being prose-
cuted for the death penalty a second time.214 In Sattazahn, Justice Gins-
burg implored, "the perils against which the Double Jeopardy Clause
seeks to protect are plainly implicated by the prospect of a second capital
sentencing proceeding. 21 5 This is precisely the type of constitutional
quagmire into which the Court has historically refused to place defen-
dants.216
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's suggestion, that a state, in the interest
of economic efficiency, would be willing to accept the default judgment
of life imprisonment as a "conditionally" final verdict, is yet another
attempt to relieve the States from the constitutional "burdens" of the
217Furman decision. By suggesting, not once, but twice in his opinion
that a state might reasonably seek to retry the death penalty should the
defendant appeal his conviction, Justice Scalia has sent a clear message
to states that unless they explicitly declare otherwise, a defendant foolish
208. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445-46.
209. See id.
210. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. See id.
215. Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 110.
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enough to appeal his conviction under these circumstances is fair
game.21 8
In conclusion, there is no line of reasoning grounded in the underly-
ing principles of double jeopardy and capital sentencing that supports the
decision in Sattazahn. If anything, Sattazahn further illustrates the ideo-
logical gulf separating members of the Court on the issue of the death
penalty. Sattazahn presented the Court with a double jeopardy question,
which was answered on post-Furman capital sentencing backlash.
CONCLUSION
In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,219 the Court rejected the principle of
protecting defendants from the dilemma of exercising their right to ap-
peal at the risk of being prosecuted a second time for the death penalty. 0
Furthermore, the Court's decision, based on a narrow application of tra-
ditional double jeopardy principles, was an attempt to alleviate some of
the post-Furman v. Georgia221 constitutional "burdens" placed on the
States, at the expense of defendants.222 Since 1972, when the Court found
that the capital sentencing process constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in Furman, our judicial system has responded by adding more and
223more constitutional protections around the capital sentencing process.
By requiring defendants such as Sattazahn to "run the gauntlet" on the
death penalty more than once, the Court is not only undermining the
fundamental goals of the double jeopardy doctrine, but is also out of step
with the capital punishment jurisprudence of the last thirty years.
The current state of capital sentencing in America reflects a con-
tinuing conflict about issues such as whether the fundamental purpose of
capital punishment should be deterrence or retribution, the potential un-
reliability of the process, and the risk of arbitrary application. 224 Ulti-
mately federal and state legislatures bear the burden of creating a consti-
225tutional capital sentencing structure. However, the Court will continue
to play a major role in shaping the capital sentencing process. As illus-
trated in Sattazahn, however, defendants with the most to lose can be-
come unwitting casualties of this continuing ideological battle.
218. See id. at 110, 114-15.
219. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
220. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
222. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 108-13; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
223. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 606.
224. See id. at 614-18 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 489 (D. Vt. 2002).
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